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that religion is simply 'done' in the individual's utility function. In contrast, we focus 
on the individual consumer's problem of maximising both human welfare and spin- 
tual welfare jointly, given a set of budgetary and time constraints and, more impor- 
tantly, the individual's spiritual leve1 represented by a parameter, y. This innovation 
in the modelling of religious behaviour allows for a spectrum of religious attitude, 
from an extreme of non-involvement in religious activity (Le. an 'atheist') to an indi- 
vidual who devotes al1 his income to religious activity. In our view, this approach rep- 
resents an innovation on previous models of religious behaviour. 
It is widely recognised5 that the contemporary economic analysis of religion 
started with the seminal paper of Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). Their model is essen- 
tially an extension of the household time allocation model of Becker (1976) to allow 
for involvement (by both wife and husband) in «church-related» activity6. For Azzi 
and Ehrenberg, participation in church-related activity bnngs three main benefits: 
afterlife consumption (the «salvation motive»); the network benefits or social bene- 
fits of being a member of a human organisation; and third, the social benefits when 
members of some organised religion enjoy access to wider career opportunities. Azzi 
and Ehrenberg focus on the former of these benefits to the exclusion of the latter two. 
Crucial to their model is the specification of the household utility function. The 
household is assumed to have two members (husband and wife), and obtain utility 
from lifetime consumption and the expected value of afterlife «consumption». In 
turn, afterlife consumption is assumed to be a function of time spent in church-relat- 
ed activities. The model predicts that individuals substitute between time and money 
devoted to religion. This, they argue, explains differences in church attendance 
between male and females. Their model may, however, be cnticised on several points. 
First, their model assumes that consumption and afterlife consumption are perfect 
substitutes. Second, there is no role for inhentance or religious donations. 
Neuman (1986) follows a methodology similar to Azzi and Ehrenberg, but focus- 
According to Iannaccone (1998) there are three major lines of inquiry by economists into reli- 
gion: first, the study of religion from an economic perspective using conventional microeconomic 
techniques; second, the economic consequences of religion; and third, the use of theology and scrip 
tures to provide a critique of economic policy. Our paper lies f imly in the first of these fields. 
Church related activity is restricted to church attendance. 
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es on the behaviour of the individual consumer rather than the household. Neuman 
specifies a 'religiosity production function', whose inputs are money spent on the 
purchase and use of religious goods and time devoted to religious activity. Religios- 
ity is assumed to be an increasing function of money spent on religious good and time 
devoted to religious activity. The model does, however, suffer from the same criti- 
cisms as the Azzi and Ehrenberg model. 
2.1. An Overview 
In conventional microeconomic analysis of consumer choice [see, for example, 
Kreps (1990) or Mas-Colell eral (1995)l an individual decision-maker maximises his 
utility subject to a budget constraint. We introduce a religious dimension to the con- 
sumer's maximisation problem, who is assumed to retain income for consumption. 
The specification by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) of a utility function defined with 
both the arguments of consumption, C, and religiosity, R, U (C, R), can be objected 
to because it implicitly assumes perfect substitution between C and R7. We avoid this 
restrictive assumption in our model by separating both these dimensions in the indi- 
vidual~ utility function. 
2.2. The Formal Model 
Let k, denote the initial individual endowment of capital, and T represents the 
individuals endowment of time. The problem facing the individual is, then, to choose 
between devoting his time to labour (work) to obtain an income; or spending time in 
religious activitiess for his salvation. The choice between consumption and leisure is 
not explicitly considered in our model, because this choice lies outside the focus of 
our work. We define only two altematives for individual i to allocate his time: activ- 
' Moreover, optimising critena for the religious decisions, although looks like a simple gener- 
alisation of the altruistic behaviour, are frequently cnticised because of theu mechanistic approach. 
Religious activity can encompass. for example. church attendance as in the model of Azzi and 
Ehrenberg (1975), andlor religious education of children and other church related activities as 
assumed in the model of Neuman (1986). 
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ity that eams income (including resting) denoted by L,, and time dedication to reli- 
gious activities, denoted by A,. Thus, the time constraint facing the individual is giv- 
en by: 
There is nothing remarkable about the time constraint in [l] and is quite consistent 
with the earlier model of Neuman (1986). The only two other restrictions are that a 
household cannot pray whilst working, and also that reiigious activity cannot eam any 
wage. Consequently, our model excludes the possibility of an individual being a priest9. 
The next stage of our analysis is related to the investment and saving behaviour of 
the individual. We assume that investment opportunities are done for each individual, 
and that the retums are known with certainty, being entirely public information. 
Following a conventional neo-classical modelling framework, the different sav- 
i n g ~  rates are related to the consumption preferentes of the individual and to the 
yields on other assets. These choices pertain to purely material choices (Le. are not 
celestial in nature), so are therefore unrelated with the analysis contained in this 
paper. The only other relevant question is the inheritance of the individual to be left 
at the end of his life (following an altruistic behaviour) for his son or daughter. More- 
over, the inheritance that an individual bequeaths to his children is an important 
dimension of the majority of mainstrearn religions. 
We can now distinguish two different individual targets facing the individual. 
First, we define human welfare by: 
where C, is the consumption for the period i of the numerarie commodity, which can 
also be interpreted as money (with unitary price); P is the discount factor of con- 
sumption, defined in the range 1 > P > O; N is the number of periods that the indi- 
vidual lives; and u(.) is an increasing function. 
As is conventional microeconomic analysis the only relevant factor is the maxi- 
mum limit of an individual's life, which is assumed to be finite. Because our focus is 
For an applied approach to modelling the behaviour of pnests see OIds (1994). Schmidtchen 
and Mayer (1997). Stevens and Loudon (1992) and Sawkins and Paterson (1996). 
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to explain the individual choices about God, inter-generational aspects are left aside. 
The second target is spiritual welfare. This is much more complicated to define 
from a methodological perspective. We define such a function as: 
where Z is the amount of church givings dedicated to other personslO, and may or 
may not be compulsory. Other donations are not considered because these would be 
too difficult to distinguish from altruist reasons. The variable Ai is the time devoted 
to prayer, and KN the amount of inheritance (as an example of religiosity) left after 
death. This money is shared according to the particular details of religious law. 
The function V( . )  is an increasing function in al1 its arguments. Morever, the sec- 
ond partial derivatives of V(. )  with respect to al1 of its arguments are assumed to be 
negative". This function cannot be interpreted as exchange between eheaven por- 
tions* and «human sacrifice» and is, thus, cannot be interpreted as a demand func- 
tion. The only way to interpret V(.) is the amount of utility that the consumer obtains 
by practising his religion. 
Next, we formalise the joint maximisation of [2] and [3], through the next func- 
tion: 
The relationship contained in [4] is a linear combination of individual objectives. 
The parameter is not solely a representation of the individual spiritual level. It also 
represents the possibility of exchange between religious and materialistic consump- 
tion, but importantly enters the utility function separately. The utility function is 
'O In our microeconomic framework, we include here resources given to other agents so that the 
recipient of consumption does not have a direct relation with the (altruistic) utility function of the 
donor. In this way, we want to exclude household or close family transfers, from which is difficult to 
separate spiritual and egoistic motivations. 
" We don't require mathematical concavity for t.(.), although. we will stop for a moment to con- 
sider what the concavity assumption implies. Ultimately concavity will reflect some Christian para- 
bles (for example, the one relative to the «lost sheep"), meaning a bigger (relative) reward for those 
that commence (or retum) in that faith compared to those who remain faithful. As there is uncertain- 
ty about what happens at the end of life, however, it does not imply opportunistic behaviour in the 
individual; individuals with different risk aversion will have a different optimising solution. Besides, 
concavity arguments are often criticised in the modelling of religious behaviour. 
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invariable to monotonic transformations, so the effect of different scales will not be 
relevant. In addition, could also incorporate the necessary transformation to obtain a 
homogeneous scale function, because it does not have to be interpreted in absolute 
value terms. 
We have chosen the specific form in [4] because the trade-off between material- 
istic and religious behaviour is made evident; however, it is only one particular devel- 
opment for the formalisation of H(.) that could have been chosen. 
Frequently, models of religious behaviour [see, for example, Iannaccone (1998)l 
make an implicit frugality hypothesis (¡.e. 'too much' consumption is 'bad' for men), 
reflecting that increasing consumption -after a determined level- is not yielding 
any addition to consumer utility. We reject such a hypothesis on normative g~ounds'~.  
In any case, such a hypothesis could also be represented by the conditions: 
dU(.) 
-= O if C>C* and - >O, - > O vZ, A 
az a A 
[SI 
dC 
where C = (C ,,..., C,); Z = (Z ,,..., Z,), and A = (A ,,..., A,). 
The following represents the constraints associated with the maximisation prob- 
lem: 
where Siis the level of savings in the ith period, and wi is the exogenously determined 
salary per unit of time13. The above budget constraints are commonly employed in 
intertemporal choice models [see, for example, Mas-Collel et al (1995)l. The invest- 
ment yields function denoted by R(.)  must be increasing. 
'* Moreover, there is no empirical support for the fmgality hypothesis. 
l 3  Although the empirical evidence provided by Grossbard-Schechtman and Neuman (1986) and 
Tomes (1996) suggest significant feedback effects between religious activity and the level of earn- 
ings, we ignore these in the model. These concerns lie outside the focus of our model and their inclu- 
sion would arguably add liitle to the main focus of our analysis. 
l4 Such taxes are quite common in mainstream religions. We employ a linear tax function (of 
income) because of ease of computation. Our function implies that donations increase with income. 
Such a stylised fact is supported by empirical evidence contained in Neuman (1986), and Iannaccone 
(1998) for the case of church contributions. 
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Religious tax, or compulsory donation, is defined as14: 
Z = Z[w,L, + RfI,.,)], with Z' > O; Z(x) < O if x < r', and 
Z(x) > O i f x >  t' [61 
where t' is the minimum leve1 of subsistence, or income limit that changes the 
household from being a net taxpayer to a net receiver of the tax, and x = w ,  + R(Ii.,). 
Specifically, we will consider the linear case, which has the following form: 
where t, = t 't. 
At this stage the problem facing the individual is too abstract to offer definite con- 
clusions, but given the value of yit is possible to determine the optimum values of 
consumption (c*) and religiosity (v*). These can be represented in diagrammatic 
form illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
C 
Fig. 1.  The interchange curve 
The exact shape of this interchange curve evidently depends on its slope. The 
slope of the interchange curve can be interpreted as the relative increase in con- 
sumption relative to the religiosity of the individual. The concavity or convexity of 
the curve will ultimately depend of the relative shapes of U(.) and V(.). Such a trade- 
off between religiosity and consumption is similar (in essence at least) to that denved 
by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), except that Azzi and Ehrenberg perceive the substitu- 
l 5  Hence the hypothesis that wives and husbands will devote different amounts of time to reli- 
gious activity given their wage profiles. 
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tion being between time and money devoted to religion15. 
Easier is the next example built on the model contained in equations [2, 3, and 41. 
If we consider only one time period, we can eliminate savings as a variable, so the 
levels of taxes depend exclusively on the leve1 of wages. Ignoring subscripts, the 
maximisation problem for the individual is: 
subject to: 
The total wage is the product of the quantity offered by the salar- per unit of time. 
As there is only one independent variable, we can simplify our problem (we suppose 
a non-negative solution in al1 variables), leaving it as a function only of L: 
Max ([wL(I-t) + tJ + [(l-y)V(wLt - t, T - L)]} [91 
L 
The fist order condition is an optimal if V(.) is concave. Clearly, this implies that 
at the optimum the following must hold: 
The particular form of the interchange curve in this case can be written down as: 
Equation [ l l ]  infers that the relationship is negative and increasing in y Given 
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any value of y (i.e. mundane preferente of the individual) we can deduct the quanti- 
ty of c he must leave to increase by one unit the consumption of v. 
In this paper we have developed a model of religious behaviour for an individual 
with determinate religious beliefs. Our model differs from previous works in that we 
do not assume that religious attitude is simply given in the individual's utility func- 
tion. Moreover, we separate from the idea of 'clubs' in religious behaviour (Iannac- 
cone, 1992). In contrast to previous work, we assume that religious aptitude is a per- 
sonal choice, which is not related with either the spouses or children's behaviour. In 
our model the religious factor is related with personal givings, attendance and inher- 
itance. Considering the inhentance of individuals is certainly an innovation in the 
modelling of religious behaviour. In addition, we relax the assumption of substitution 
between giving and attendance made in the model of Neuman (1986), because this 
stylised fact is only supported by empirical evidence for the case of Jews. 
The utility function we specify is a combination between human and celestial 
consurnption. The value of y gives us the degree of religiosity of the individual, so 
that an optimal combination will depend on moral attitudes. Moreover, this allows the 
individual to allocate in a wide spectrum of religiosity. 
Offenng a preliminary approach to this question, we obtain the result that differ- 
ent levels of religiosity and selfish attitude depend upon the extent to which an indi- 
vidual values the next life. This relationship will define a convex boundary of (opti- 
mal) combinations of religiosity and consumption. We have shown that the shape of 
this boundary depends on the shape of the human welfare and spiritual welfare func- 
tions. 
We would like to thank T. G. Weyman-Jones and J. R. Presley (Loughborough 
University) and M. Cabañes and J. Massiá (Universidad CEU-S. Pablo, Madrid) for 
helpful comments on earlier versions. The usual disclairners apply. 
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